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Abstract   
 
This article considers the place of qualitative research in psychoanalysis and 
child psychotherapy. It discusses why research methodology for many years 
occupied so small a place in these fields, and examines the cultural and social 
developments since the 1960s which have changed this situation, giving 
formal methods of research much greater significance. It reflects on the 
different pressures to develop formal research methods  which arise both from 
outside the psychoanalytic field, as a condition of its continued professional 
survival, and from within it,  where its main aim is the development of 
fundamental psychoanalytic knowledge,  It suggests that the conduct of 
mainly quantitative research into treatment outcomes is largely a response to 
these external pressures, whilst the main benefits to be gained from  the  
development of qualitative research methods, such as Grounded Theory, are  
in facilitating the knowledge-generating capacities and achievements of child 
psychotherapists themselves.  The paper describes Grounded Theory 
methods, and explains how they can be valuable in the recognition of hitherto 
unrecognised meanings and patterns as these are made visible in clinical 
practice.  Finally, it briefly describes five different examples of completed 
doctoral studies, all of which have added significantly to the knowledge-base 
of child psychotherapy, and which demonstrate how much can be 
accomplished using this method of research.   
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Research Methods in Psychoanalysis: a strange absence   
 
Psychoanalysis has been unusual in the limited attention it has previously 
given to what are referred to in other scientific fields as ‘research methods’.    
Whereas most disciplines discuss, evolve and codify their methods of 
generating and validating knowledge as a substantial part of their activity, 
psychoanalysis has mostly not done this, or at least, not under the 
categorisation of research as such.1 There is no parallel in the field of 
psychoanalysis to the large literatures on research methods in sociology, 
psychology and history, in which alternative approaches, controversies and 
textbooks abound. Sociology, for example, sought to establish itself as a 
scientific discipline - seeking to demarcate itself from merely descriptive and 
anecdotal writings about society, and from rival disciplines such as 
psychology and economics -   by clarifying its own methodological principles, 
with statistical theory and the techniques of social surveys and structured 
interviews a central element of this. There is probably no degree course in 
sociology taught anywhere which does not have a substantial component of 
research methodology. To an even greater degree, academic psychology has 
largely defined itself by its claims to scientificity, and by the systematic 
attention it has given to methods of research. 
 
But despite its apparent indifference to research methodology, the field of 
psychoanalysis can lay claim to have constituted one of the most productive 
paradigms of evolving knowledge of the last 100 and more years. Pathways of 
development of  psychoanalytic theories and clinical techniques can be traced 
back to Freud’s initial discoveries, through theoretical lineages such as that of 
Freud-Klein-Bion and their post-Kleinian successors, and in schools such as 
the contemporary Freudians, the British Independents, the Relational School 
in the United States, and equally distinctive developments in France 
1 A valuable exception was the special issue of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
edited by David Tuckett, devoted to ‘Clinical Facts’. (IJPA 1994).    
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(influenced by Lacan) and in Latin America.  In the literatures which report 
and codify these developments, the place of what in other fields would be 
defined as ‘research’, instead tends to be termed ‘technique’, reflecting the 
fact that psychoanalysis is above all a practice-based discipline, in which 
discoveries are made in the context of clinical work, not in a separate 
research-dedicated domain of the laboratory or other contexts of investigation. 
Freud’s original discoveries of the unconscious information-bearing 
significance of dreams and patients’ associations to them; of the transference 
and its later development by analysts such as Strachey (1934);  the 
subsequent recognition of the counter-transference as a source of 
understanding of patients (Heimann 1950)  and Klein’s (1926)  discovery that 
children’s play could provide a form of access to unconscious mental life in 
the treatment of children, are all examples of the close links between major 
new developments in clinical technique and the emergence of new theoretical 
ideas. Even Lacan’s unsettling clinical techniques, refusing the disciplined 
regularity of other psychoanalytic approaches (and getting Lacan into great 
trouble with the psychoanalytic authorities) were related to his theory of 
unconscious mental life and its necessarily disruptive qualities.   
 
Psychoanalysts, including the most original and creative among them, have 
for the most part believed that knowledge could be advanced through 
combining deep knowledge and the continuing interrogation of established 
concepts and theories, with close attention to the phenomena which are 
revealed to them in their consulting rooms. Belief in this method has been 
vindicated by its outcomes in the advancement of knowledge. The 
psychoanalytic paradigm, founded on its core assumptions concerning the 
significance of unconscious mental processes in psychological development 
has followed a pattern of ‘speciation’ of its field of knowledge. This was the 
term for the process of evolutionary differentiation and ‘branching’ which 
Thomas Kuhn (2000) using a Darwinian metaphor, believed characterised the 
development of most fields of science. Sciences and their methods of 
investigation differ substantially from one another (Galison and Stump 1996), 
reflecting the attributes of their different ‘objects of study’ and it may be useful 
to consider with which other fields of inquiry psychoanalysis has the most 
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affinity. It seems closest to evolutionary biology. Both fields combine 
subscription to a cluster of  fundamental explanatory laws and  principles, 
established in their founding  ‘scientific revolution  (Darwin’s in one case,2 
Freud’s in the other) , with a ‘normal science’  (rule-governed practices)  
which investigate the explanatory powers of these laws for large numbers of  
instances, always taking account of their particular attributes.3 In the 
Darwinian case, this was, and remains, the study of different species in their 
interactions with their environments (their ecology). In psychoanalysis, it is the 
study of individuals, in their specificity, in relation to their human environment, 
and within the analytic relationship itself. 4 
 
Even psychoanalysts who have been deeply concerned at the refusal of 
psychoanalysis to engage with the formal protocols of scientific method, and 
fear its extinction as a result have sometimes admitted that despite its 
deficiencies, the traditional method of the clinical case-study has been fertile 
in its capacity to generate theoretical insight and understanding5. Thus, 
against those who have insisted that psychoanalysis adopts methods closer 
2 The basic principles in the evolutionary case include (a) random genetic variation by 
mutation (b) competition between the ensuing varieties for reproductive success (c) 
competitive (and interdependent) forms of adaptations to changing environments.   
3 Scientific ornithology well illustrates this pattern of development. The descriptive 
observations of bird species with which most people are familiar, if only from natural history 
programmes on television, are paralleled by meticulously researched quantitative researches, 
for example studying the effects of crop-changes on the population densities of particular 
species, or the interactions of predator with predated populations. Bird Studies, the 
international journal of the British Trust for Ornithology, is notable for its uncompromising 
commitment to quantitative methods, but its articles remain Darwinian in their theoretical 
basis.   
4 Here is the memorable conclusion to Darwin’s Origin of Species:  “Thus, from the war of 
nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving,  
life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and 
that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so 
simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are 
being, evolved.” The equivalent ‘endless forms’ in psychoanalysis are the variety and 
uniqueness of human personalities. 
5 “As Peter Fonagy and Mary Target (2003, p. 3-4) have put it “The psychology that Freud 
discovered and elaborated has enjoyed considerable success as an explanatory framework. 
This is because its few basic assumptions and propositions are open to endless revision and 
refinement, and, arguably, because the clinical procedure that provides its evidential base 
offers a unique perspective on the human mind.’ While they urged psychoanalysts and child 
psychotherapists to adopt research methods compatible with mainstream psychology, they 
also urged developmental psychologists to learn from the subtlety and complexity of 
psychoanalytic descriptions and explanations, which their book indeed describes.  While there 
are ‘more psychoanalytic theories than we need’, there are also ‘unique features to each body 
of theory.’ (p 2.)  
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to the conventional scientific mainstream (in practice this usually means the 
mainstream of psychology)  might one wonder that if the traditional clinical 
method is not broken, so far as its generative capacity is concerned, how 
much is it desirable to change it?     
 
Perhaps  the ‘traditional method’ of the clinical case study has been  adhered 
to for so long because it is only by giving  attention to the phenomena of the 
transference and counter- transference that unconscious mental life can be 
accessed and described.  ‘Fixes’ and improvements to this method may be 
resisted by psychoanalysts because departure from this investigative method 
may require compromising their central task, which is to study unconscious 
mental processes. In other words, methods of understanding, in 
psychoanalysis as in other fields, are indissolubly linked to their content. The 
psychoanalyst’s concern is that while more conventionally scientific research 
methods applied to their field may be productive of knowledge of certain 
kinds, they may lose sight of its psychoanalytic object.    
 
Without prejudging questions of choice between relevant research methods, it 
is nevertheless clear that it is mainly something extraneous to psychoanalytic 
understanding itself has been driving the demand for the pursuit of 
conventionally scientific methods in psychoanalysis. The principal anxiety has 
been about the absence of evidence for the outcomes of psychoanalytic 
treatments of mental illness. The question, from health service 
commissioners, competing mental health professions, and indeed potential 
clients or patients which psychoanalysts have been under increasing pressure 
to answer is, ‘does it work?’ Or indeed how much does it work, and for whom?  
One can accept the appropriateness of these questions (who would want to 
practice in ways which have been proved to be ineffectual?) yet note that they 
are somewhat different from many of those which have routinely preoccupied 
psychoanalysts and child psychotherapists. These latter are about the nature 
and functioning of the unconscious mind, the development of personality, 
failures of psychological development, and the nature of the psychoanalyst-
patient relationship. These are the fundamental objects of research of 
psychoanalysis. The clinical case study methods which mainly been used to 
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study these matters are sometimes referred to as ‘therapy process research’  
(Midgley 2004 p. 92) although this description risks mistaking a means of 
investigation for its object. It should however be noted  that the investigation 
of outcomes of a kind has always been central  to  fundamental 
psychoanalytic research also, since one sometimes (contentious) measure of 
whether a true understanding of unconscious states of mind has been 
achieved is the ways in which patients respond to being understood. 6      
 
A historical perspective  
 
The absence of the psychoanalytic field from the field of methodological 
debate in the human sciences has a cultural and ideological origin. This lies in 
the attacks made on Freud’s own claims for psychoanalysis as a science by 
philosophers of science such as Karl Popper (1963), and in greater rigour by 
Adolf Grunbaum (1973), and other fierce critics of the field. (Indeed 
psychoanalysis is as notable for the hostility of its enemies as for the 
commitment of its friends.) There appeared to be a discrepancy between 
Popper’s influential model of how sciences advanced, through the 
‘falsification’ and abandonment of hypotheses claiming universal validity, and 
classic psychoanalytic methods of investigation. In particular, Popper and 
Grunbaum rejected the idea that patients’ response to interpretations could 
constitute valid evidence for their truth-content. 7 
 
However it has later become evident that Popper’s falsificationist model 
corresponds to few actual fields of scientific practice, once it became 
recognised, following the contribution of Thomas Kuhn, a historian of science, 
that the sciences were more diverse in their attributes than Popper’s 
prescriptive view had asserted them to be. (Puttnam 1975, Stove 1982).   
 
6 One is tempted to suggest that clinical research has been the primary location of 
psychoanalysis as science, while outcome research is its technology.     
7 Robert Hinshelwood (2015) has attempted to show that it is possible in rigorously conducted 
clinical research to subject psychoanalytic theories to the Popperian test of falsifiability. For a 
commentary on his arguments see Rustin (2015).   
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Within the human sciences, there were different responses to the hegemony 
of this positivist, or more precisely ‘falsificationist’, definition of science. Some 
human science disciplines responded by adopting methods which sought to to 
comply with the prescriptive philosophers’ model of scientific investigation. 
(Usually this meant privileging experimental and quantitative methods over 
naturalistic observation and qualitative approaches.) In Britain, the discipline 
of psychology overwhelmingly chose this route. It thereby won itself a position 
in the academy as a reputable science, and became widely licensed by the 
state as an applied ‘human technology’, to its great professional advantage. 
Psychoanalysis mostly withdrew itself from such arguments about scientific 
legitimacy, and chose instead to remain within its enclave of clinical practice, 
mainly dependent for its economic sustenance on the demand for 
psychoanalytic treatment by private patients. It functioned as a self-regulated 
profession rather than as an accredited scientific discipline. As a 
consequence it had for many years no significant place, in the United 
Kingdom, in the university systems of undergraduate and postgraduate 
education and received no governmental support for research. While it 
retained a significant cultural presence in society, this was more diffused 
through the humanities - literature, drama, fine art, cinema, popular culture, 
and philosophy – than the sciences, including the social sciences such as 
politics, sociology, economics and anthropology.8  (The last, the most 
particularistic and humane of the social sciences, was a partial exception.)  
Indeed it is often said that psychoanalysis is a hybrid field of knowledge, part 
science, part humanity, because its concerns are not only with laws of cause 
and effect, but also with interpretation, with subjective meanings, and with 
individual differences (Ricoeur 1970) These habits of thought are in contrast 
to the impersonal and ‘objective’ standpoint which is deemed to characterise 
the sciences.     
 
8 John Forrester and Laura Cameron’s   research on the presence of psychoanalysis in 
Cambridge University in the 1930s has revealing its unexpected influence within scientific 
circles, but this does not seem to have advanced its scientific status very much. Several of 
their papers can be accessed at   http://www.people.hps.cam.ac.uk/index/teaching-
officers/forrester 
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Different and contradictory pressures came together, from the 1960s,   to 
change this situation.  The expansion of higher education, and the 
accompanying increase in academic credentialisation gave rise to demands 
upon many fields of professional education, including the psychotherapies, to 
obtain academic recognition. The impact of these were even felt in fields like 
fine art, where traditional practice-based methods of learning were now 
expected to comply with academic norms in which students’ work had to be 
classified, measured and graded as it was in other  disciplines. In the mental 
health field the Tavistock Clinic was instructed by government in the early 
1980s to obtain academic accreditation for its professional trainings as a 
condition of their continued central funding. Many psychotherapy programmes 
were placed under these pressures, sometimes finding that they could make 
relationships which universities which supported their work, and sometimes 
that their professional approaches and those of the academy were 
incompatible.  Demands came from students and trainees too. Why, they 
asked, should years of training in psychotherapy not lead to the same level of 
academic qualification as a clinical psychology student might obtain? Child 
psychotherapy and other professions whose development had taken place in 
institutions like the Tavistock Clinic became victims of their own success. As 
they came to occupy a larger and better-funded place within mental health 
services, they were expected to function just like other state-regulated 
professions.   
 
This was during a period, from the 1980s to the present, when the moral 
authority and autonomy of many professions had come under political attack. 
It was argued by their critics that their claims to altruism and concern for the 
well-being of their clients were merely providing cover for their own 
occupational self-interest (Le Grand 2006). If formerly passive clients of public 
services could be transformed into active consumers within competitive 
markets or quasi-markets, their interests and needs would, it was argued, be 
better served. Institutions like schools, universities and hospitals became 
required to compete for their clients with public measures of their relative 
performance, via ‘league tables’ and the like, to facilitate ‘consumer choice’.  
But on the other hand, belying the freedom and choice which markets are 
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supposed to bring about, much more stringent regulation of provision was 
imposed, for example through the National Curriculum for Schools, and 
through batteries of  inspections and audits. This system of governance has 
been described as the new managerialism. (Clarke and Newman (1997) 
Clarke, J.H., Gewirtz, S, McLaughlin, E. (eds) (2000). The requirement that 
medical practice should become ‘evidence-based’, and the role of NICE 
(National Institute for Clinical Excellence) guidelines in regulating available 
treatments was the equivalent of this development in the National Health 
Service. In mental health, this demand began to seriously constrain the 
autonomy of professionals. It became difficult to obtain recognition of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapies as fundable forms of mental health treatment, 
without ‘scientific’ demonstrations of their effectiveness.    These demands, for 
credentialised postgraduate education, and for demonstrable evidence of 
treatment outcomes, placed pressure on psychoanalytic psychotherapy. 
Academically-trained psychologists were at first more adept at meeting these 
challenges than the psychoanalytically-minded, and the rise of Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy  reflected this capability,  becoming the treatment of 
choice in the Improved Access to Psychological Therapies expanded 
programme for mental health which Richard Layard and David Clarke (2015)  
persuaded governments to adopt. These new norms were especially 
constraining where, as with child psychotherapy, most treatments were 
funded by the NHS.  Psychoanalysts working mainly in private practice were 
more insulated from these pressures. This situation, made worse by 
constraints on NHS funding, is leading to some flight of psychotherapists from 
the public sector. Progress which had been made in making psychoanalytic 
psychotherapies available to a broader population with mental held needs is 
now being reversed.  
 
But while these pressures have sometimes been seen as threatening to 
psychoanalysis, there have been some creative responses to them.   
Educational programmes have been developed which remain psychoanalytic 
in their essence but which have also been able to satisfy academic 
requirements for rigour and accountability. Similar positive responses have 
been made to demands to provide evidence of treatment effectiveness. In the 
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last few years in Britain, and also, for example  in  Germany and the USA, 
several significant outcome research projects have been completed which 
comply with the requirements of the ‘gold standard’ of the randomised 
controlled clinical trial, without compromising an authentically psychoanalytic 
method of treatment. (Kennedy 2004, Kennedy and Midgley (2007), Midgley 
and Kennedy (2011).  
 
One should note, however, that the pressures for credentialisation and 
regulation which have become so prominent since the 1980s were preceded 
by a more favourable cultural and political climate in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The field of mental health and its treatment has been influenced both by the 
radical political culture of the earlier period, and by the conservative reaction 
to it since the 1970s. Whereas the later ‘neoliberal’ period has been marked 
by the imposition of the norms of the market and of restrictive regulation, the 
earlier period was one of radical cultural challenges to authorities of many 
kinds.  These have been contradictory movements in our culture, ascendant 
at different times, but each remaining active and in conflict with one another 
throughout this period.   
 
It was only because there had been radical challenges to the ruling academic 
orthodoxies in the 1960s and 1970s that creative responses to the later 
‘credentialising’ demands on the mental health professions became possible. 
Some of the cultural capital which had accumulated in the earlier period, 
remained available as a resource for resistance when the counter-pressures 
of a conservative or ‘neoliberal’ kind made themselves felt from the 1980s.9 
 
Challenges to the dominant stratified and authoritarian culture were in part a 
consequence of the huge educational expansion which had taken place since 
the war. This allowed hitherto subordinated and unheard fractions of the 
population to find a visible cultural presence and public voice. Those who 
originally authorised the mass expansion of the educational system, including 
9 Nick Midgley (2006) has noted that at the beginning of his research career, qualitative 
methods were excluded from mental health research, but that in later years their relevance 
became accepted.   
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university education, may have anticipated that the existing cultural 
hierarchies would merely be reproduced, but on an extended scale.  But this 
is not entirely what happened. New unruly voices began to be heard, and 
dissensions emerged around the axes, for example, of class, gender, 
generation, ethnicity and sexuality.10  
 
The sciences themselves were affected by conflicts over authority and 
legitimacy. Thomas Kuhn’s ‘Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1962)  
published at the beginning of the 1960s, was pathbreaking, since it 
recognised that scientific investigation itself had historically been subject to 
contestation and change. The sciences were shown to be social constructs, 
like other forms of symbolic representation.  Kuhn’s  concept of  changing 
‘paradigms’ of knowledge was immensely liberating to researchers in many 
fields where restrictive orthodoxies had held sway, and in which theoretical 
and methodological innovation had been forcefully discouraged.  
Psychoanalysts were among those who saw the relevance of Kuhn’s ideas for 
their work – a search for ‘psychoanalysis’ and ‘paradigm’ on the internet 
generates 50,000 references.  
 
The field of sociology well illustrates this pattern of liberated development.  In 
the 1960s and 1970s the subject expanded rapidly. Increased interest in it 
expressed the desires of students, many of them the first in their families to go 
to university, to understand their rapidly-changing and contested society, and 
their own position as mobile individuals within it.  (The experience of the   
working class ‘scholarship boy’ described by Richard Hoggart (1967), was 
emblematic.)  As the discipline grew, especially within new universities and 
polytechnics, challenges to its previous ‘positivistic’ orthodoxies emerged, 
leading to a sometimes bewildering proliferation of theories and methods. One 
such perspective was that sociologists should investigate and report the 
experiences of social actors from their own subjective points of view, and not 
merely ‘from above’, from the perspective of society’s government and policy-
10 Demands to return to educational ‘basics’ and to return to a more traditional curriculum 
have been made by conservative educationalists from the 1970s onwards, in the first instance 
by the authors of the Black Papers.  These arguments have had a considerable influence on 
the educational policy of successive governments. On this history see Ball (2013).   
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makers. Just as American popular culture had challenged the norms of British 
‘high culture’, and created assertive new forms of expression especially 
attractive to the young, so the sociological perspective of ‘symbolic 
interactionism’ in the United States gave social scientists in Britain 
interpretative research methods by which they could study education from the 
point of view of low-stream children, or delinquency and crime which took 
account of the experiences of delinquents. Many disciplines were influenced 
by this more democratic climate. ‘Cultural studies’ emerged, in competition 
with traditional humanities disciplines, and gave legitimacy to the study of 
popular culture.  A radical genre of ‘history from below’ developed, which 
studied the experiences of subordinated, often working class, people. Even in 
a field as conservative as military history, a leading historian such as John 
Keegan (1976) wrote about war not only from the usual point of view of 
generals and statesmen, but describing the experience of the ordinary soldier. 
Clifford Geertz’s (1973) cultural anthropology, with its emphasis on the 
interpretation of cultures  - the meanings created by social actors themselves 
– and even the later Wittgenstein’s refocusing of philosophy on different 
‘forms of life’  - can also be seen as aspects of a democratisation  of 
intellectual inquiry. 
 
In an unexpected way, this new climate was congruent with a fundamental 
principle of psychoanalysis. This is that the starting point for all psychoanalytic 
understanding is the experience of the patient, as this is communicated to the 
analyst or psychotherapist in the transference situation. While psychoanalysis 
has from the beginning evolved a technical language for use within its 
scientific community, it has always been essential to its practice that its 
insights be communicable to patients in the ordinary language of human 
emotions. (This is particularly necessary in the psychoanalysis of children.)  A 
precondition of any psychoanalytic research method is that it must take 
account of the ‘subjective’ dimensions of experience, not only of the patient 
but of the analyst too. What differentiates this from a parallel insistence on the 
dimensions of meaning and subjectivity in other social sciences, and 
continues to cause friction with even with their more interpretative schools, is 
its belief that these have an unconscious dimension which is by definition not 
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readily transparent to investigation. Although psychoanalysis in many 
respects is not at all populist or egalitarian in its assumptions (it often 
endorses certain kinds of innate authority and difference, for example those 
related to the ‘facts of life’ of generation and gender11) it is nevertheless (by 
intention at least) respectful of every individual’s mental life, in a way which 
differentiates it from more ‘objectifying’ kinds of psychology and psychiatry.   
 
The generation of knowledge in child psychotherapy   
 
This heuristic starting point in the experience of the person, as this is revealed 
within the therapeutic relationship, is what has given rise to psychoanalysis’s 
reliance on the clinical case study as its primary source of empirical data and 
understanding. There are few theoretical developments in psychoanalysis, at 
least in Britain, which do not make reference to clinical instances or case 
narratives in their justification.   
 
British psychoanalytic writing, and writing in child psychotherapy, appears to 
possess a ‘deep grammar’, whose recurrent features are: 
 
 (a) the setting-out of a relevant field of concepts and theories, most often 
sourced to specific canonical, or exemplary texts 
 
(b) a description – often very brief - of the background of a clinical case   
 
(c) an exposition of some segment of clinical material from a case or cases,  
from which is inferred the presence of an explanatory structure or process set 
out in the terms of  psychoanalytical theory  
 
 (d)  a conclusion explaining how the instance(s) give evidence for and 
exemplify  addition to knowledge which the particular  paper is purporting to 
provide.   
 
11 Money Kyrle’s are the best formulations of this principle. (1968, 1971).  
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However, the relationships which exist between source concepts and 
theories, clinical material, and the conceptualisations which emerges from 
them, are varied and complicated. There is a study to be made of such 
variations of form. In some key papers, clinical material has been set out 
which an analyst demonstrates is inconsistent with the received theoretical 
assumptions which she had taken as her initial frame of reference. The 
material, or ‘clinical facts’ identified within it, are then cited as grounds for a 
departure from or extension to the established theory.   
 
Here are three examples of this way of announcing a new psychoanalytical 
discovery. One is Klein’s (1926) demonstration of the significance of 
unconscious phantasy in the early life of the child, through the use of the 
technique of ‘play therapy’.  A second is Herbert Rosenfeld’s (1971) 
distinction between ‘libidinal’ and ‘destructive narcissism’, thus bifurcating the 
pre-existing concept of narcissism, and mapping the two parts on to Freud’s 
dual concepts of the life and death instincts. Rosenfeld grounded this in his 
description of a patient whose analysis only made progress (that is, gave rise 
to a new flow of thoughts and feelings) once he had recognised that this new 
category, of ‘destructive narcissism’, corresponded to what he was now 
observing and experiencing. A third example is Paula Heimann’s (1950)  
description of her first recognition of the knowledge-bearing significance of the 
counter-transference, as she explored with a patient the hypothesis that the 
persisting disturbance which she was experiencing  in her work with him 
reflected her patient’s mental disturbance more than her own, as she had at 
first feared was the case. 
 
This exemplary genre of theoretical advance is paradoxically quite close to 
the ‘falsificationist’ model according to which psychoanalysis, according to 
Popper, had failed to meet the criteria of an authentic science.  In these 
instances it does seem that hypotheses derived from existing theories were 
tested and abandoned specifically because they were disconfirmed by clinical 
evidence. Alternative hypotheses were then adopted which better 
corresponded to the clinical facts. 
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In most psychoanalytic publications which have advanced knowledge, 
however, the relation between clinical evidence and theoretical development 
is by no means  as clear-cut as in these instances. A great deal of clinically-
based writing aims to demonstrate, how the development of a personality 
formation, or a specific therapeutic difficulty, can be explained by reference to 
concepts and theories which are already known and accepted. Often it is the 
description and interpretation of a clinical instance which is given priority, not 
the questioning or modification of an existing theory. Its relevance is in 
providing additional empirical evidence of  validity.  Because psychoanalytic 
investigations are usually made in clinical contexts on a ‘case-by-case’ basis, 
theories are mainly tested through the sequential accumulation and 
comparison of such cases.12 These usually take place over a period of time, 
and through the work of different practitioners. This is how  promising new 
ideas, first often put forward by leading figures in the field, have been  
exposed to extensive clinical tests. These ‘tests’, informal as they usually are, 
may lead to the discovery of new ideas or theories, and/or their elaboration to 
take account of new phenomena.  
 
An example of this second pattern of discovery is the understanding of the 
psychopathology and therapeutic treatment of severely deprived children, 
which emerged as an area of practice central to child psychotherapy in the 
1970s, and has developed since then. 13 Certain key theoretical ideas, 
drawing in particular  on Klein’s theory of the paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive positions, and on Bion’s theory of projective identification and of 
the container-contained relation, were brought together by child 
psychotherapists to make sense of the troubled and often violent internal 
worlds of children whose early caring relationships had been grossly deficient 
or abusive. Child psychotherapists sought to understand the consequences of 
these internal states of mind for their patients’ relationship with their carers, 
often by inference from their experience of the children in their own 
12 Nick Midgley (2004,p. 92) has usefully described this process of inference as ‘generalising 
to a theory’.  
13 The starting point of this development was Gianna Henry (later Williams)’ paper ‘Doubly 
Deprived’ (1974), then followed by the collection of papers edited by Boston and Szur (1983). 
Many significant papers have followed, mainly published in this journal. A recent collection is 
Andrew Briggs’ (ed)  Waiting to be Found (2012). 
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transference relationship with them. The prominence of such children in the 
case-loads of child psychotherapists in the NHS arises from the fact that 
these emerging understandings and techniques gave rise to a capacity to 
work therapeutically with them more effectively  than other mental health 
professionals.     
 
This sub-field is an example of the way in which core psychoanalytic ideas 
have been both tested out, case by case, and elaborated to take account of 
variations in patterns of psychological development. It is an example of 
‘speciation’ in which a sub-field of psychoanalytical theory has advanced in a 
branching pattern, each sub-branch describing a specific variation. Examples 
are developments which arise from the absence of fathers, parental addiction 
to drugs, domestic violence, sexual abuse, or circumstances where a looked-
after child has been subject to many changes of placement, or adoption.  One 
can trace similar evolutions from a ‘core theory’ in other areas of clinical 
specialism, such as autistic or Aspergers personality formation, or concerning 
the unconscious concomitants of physical or mental disability.14 
  
The fact that knowledge is advanced in psychoanalysis through the 
understanding of variations  and differences –for example  in patterns of 
development, personality formations,  mental disorders, and  therapeutic 
techniques -  works against  its theoretical unification.  The need for 
psychoanalysis (and child psychotherapy)  to have fewer theories, but more 
powerful ones better supported by empirical evidence, has been forcefully 
advanced by critics of the traditional case study method by influential 
psychoanalytic researchers such as Peter Fonagy (2009), Robert Wallerstein 
(2005) and David Tuckett (2000, 2005). The idea is that such unification 
14 The Tavistock Clinic Karnac book series includes many examples of edited collections of 
papers which report developments in these various sub-paradigms of child psychotherapy 
theory and practice. Even though most of these make little reference to formalised methods of 
research, one should surely these collections as the reports of a successful ongoing child 
psychotherapy research programme. Indeed given its evidential basis in clinical practice, one 
can equally view the development of the whole corpus of psychoanalytic theory as the 
outcome of a multi-faceted research programme. It is important than the designation of 
‘research’ should not be confined to those practices which conform to the norms of clinical 
psychology, which often provides the implicit model of scientific legitimation in this field, but 
should respect the outcomes of the ‘normal science’ of psychoanalytic clinical practice.    
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would bring psychoanalysis closer in its theories and methods to other 
scientific fields, some of which are able to work at much greater levels of 
generality. However it seems that one could pay a high price for theoretical 
unity, in the disappearance of the variety and difference which make some 
fields interesting and theoretically productive in the first place.  Theoretical 
developments in psychoanalysis often do not conform either to purely 
‘deductive’ (i.e. logical) models of explanation, or ‘inductive’ ones (inferences 
from experience). They may combine both dimensions, or arise unexpectedly 
as a consequence of an intuitive insight by a psychoanalyst. Such intuitions 
are commonly part of scientific investigations.    
 
Metaphors, as Ronald Britton (2015) has  pointed out, may have a vital role in 
creating new understandings in psychoanalysis  A metaphor, according to the 
classical formulation by Max Black (1962) is a formulation which asserts an 
equivalence between the properties of a field whose attributes are already 
understood, to one where this is not yet the case.15 (One can think of this 
relation as between target and source). An example of the power of metaphor 
can be seen in the theory of the container-contained relation first put forward 
by Bion. The crucial equivalence (metaphors make a more immediate 
conceptual leap than assertions  of perceived similarity) was between the 
projective processes observed by Bion in his work with psychotic patients, 
and the projective unconscious exchanges which take place between  
mothers and their babies. This may have been essentially a leap of the 
imagination by Bion, since he is not known to have worked either clinically or 
as an observer with mothers and infants. His insight developed from Klein’s 
earlier discoveries about early mother-infant relations, and perhaps also from 
what he may have learned from Esther Bick with whom he was in close touch 
about the infant observation method which she was pioneering. Bion’s 
recognition of the significance of the container-contained relation, and of the 
projective and introjective processes which it framed, proved to be highly 
15 Thus the concept of a computer virus makes use of our previous understanding of 
biological viruses to understand many attributes of these ‘infections’ of computer software.  
The reason why this metaphorical equivalence works so well is because biological viruses are 
themselves essentially bearers of information, liable to reproduce themselves within an 
appropriate host. 
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significant for the understanding of  unconscious mental life in many different 
contexts, for example those of infancy, the consulting room, child 
development, and indeed of  institutions. 
 
Grounded theory in child psychotherapy  
 
The pattern of knowledge-generation which I have described above preceded 
the development of formalised methods of data analysis, such as Grounded 
Theory or Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), which over the last 
twenty or so years have become widely used, in part as a consequence of the 
development of doctoral studies in psychoanalysis.16 It is a requirement of 
study17 for doctoral degrees, whether PhD or Professional Doctorate, that an 
explicit research method is set out, and that research findings can be shown 
to have been generated or validated through the application of such a 
method.  
 
The affinity between Grounded Theory methods and qualitative research in 
psychoanalysis lies in approaches both to the collection and the analysis of 
data.  Grounded Theory methods were originally developed by sociologists to 
understand data gathered in the form of open-ended observations, and 
relatively unstructured interviews. It was essentially a naturalistic method, 
aiming to capture the complexity of social life as it takes place. In this respect 
it was distinct from the methodologies of contrived experiments, or structured 
social surveys whose design incorporates prior theorisations and hypotheses 
about a chosen object of research. 
 
Psychoanalysis, and its associated observational methods of study, is also in 
its own way ‘naturalistic’, in that its primary materials for study are the 
16  David Tuckett (1994) was an early advocate of the use of Grounded Theory methods in 
psychoanalysis.  
17 Grounded Theory and IPA are comparable in their prescription of methods of line-by-line or 
segment-by-segment coding, and thus to a degree may be interchangeable methods for 
analysing data.  However they differ in so far as the objective of Grounded Theory is the 
development of theory, while that of IPA is more  the elucidation of actors’ own understanding 
of a situation. Grounded Theory emerged from sociology, a strongly theoretical discipline, IPA 
from psychology, which has usually adopted a more minimaliist theoretical approach to its 
objects of study.   
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communications which are made to analysts in settings which have definite 
boundaries, but which otherwise leave a great deal of space for patients to set 
agendas and provide communications (of different kinds) which it is the work 
of psychoanalytic therapy to understand.  Thus a research method which 
expects that meaning will emerge from data which has little predetermined  
content or shape is appropriate for psychoanalysis as well as for naturalistic 
kinds of sociological or anthropological study. In this respect it can be 
contrasted with the method of an experimental research design such as the 
attachment theorists’  ‘Strange Situation Test.’   
 
In regard to the analysis of data, Janet Anderson (2006) has pointed out that 
Grounded Theory has been adopted as a research method  by many child 
psychotherapist researchers because its  analytic procedures  are so close to 
the ‘line by line’  practice of  supervision through which they have previously 
learned to reflect on the meanings of clinical material. The ideas of line-by-line 
analysis, and of conceptual and theoretical coding set out by the 
methodologists of Grounded Theory, thus turned out to closely mirror the 
practice which experienced psychoanalytic supervisors carried out orally in 
dialogue with their trainees. They are indeed, as Anderson pointed out, “well-
suited partners.”  
 
The advantage of the Grounded Theory protocol over oral supervision is that 
its inferential steps, from transcripts of session records, to summative 
theoretical concepts and categories, are required to be set out in both 
narrative and tabular form. They are in this way made transparent and 
‘accountable’ to readers, line by line, segment-by-segment or session by 
session.   Presentations of this method also require that researchers justify 
their selection of clinical material for analysis, by explicit criteria. A radical 
form of  selection is usually necessary since the volume of clinical material 
generated by intensive clinical cases is far larger than can  be presented in its 
totality. Criteria of selection may differ – examples are sampling of different 
periods in a therapy, focus on moments of especial clinical intensity, and  
‘turning points’, – but the central  requirement is that the criteria must be 
explicitly justified.  This presentation of clinical material and the theoretical 
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inferences drawn from it makes it possible to improve on the much-criticised 
practice of illustrating arguments with ‘clinical vignettes’, whose relation to a 
larger clinical record might be poorly explained. 18 Analysts have always used 
their clinical judgement to decide whether claims made for the significance of 
case material are justified or not, and their judgements were often sound. But 
since in more academic research contexts such ‘subjective’ judgements are 
deemed to be insufficient or unreliable, the greater transparency of 
expositions based on Grounded Theory offer a signficant methodological gain.    
 
One early difficulty in the adaptation of Grounded Theory methods to 
psychoanalysis has been overcome through the softening of an early ‘anti-
theoretical’ demand by Grounded Theory’s pioneers that empirical data 
should be collected and analysed witout  theoretical preconceptions about 
their possible meaning. As the Grounded Theory method was adopted by 
disciplines beyond its original field of sociology, it became recognised that 
some theoretical assumptions, however implicit, are likely to define and 
influence every investigation (Charmaz 2006). Thus  there is no such thing in 
research as a tabula rasa, since data cannot be identified and specified 
without some criteria of selection. There is no reason for psychoanalysis to be 
an exception to this principle. The requirement of Grounded Theory is not to 
have a blank mind in the face of data, but rather that a researcher should hold 
in abeyance her expectations about possible meanings, and to allow 
inferences to emerge from the encounter with the material itself.  Similarly, 
when Bion asked psychoanalysts to ‘eschew memory and desire’ on entering 
a clinical setting, he surely did not mean that they should forget everything 
they had previously learned about psychoanalysis. It is clear that Bion’s own 
clinical understandings were informed by his own deep theoretical knowledge.   
 
Outward-facing and inward-facing research in child psychotherapy  
 
A useful distinction can be made between the demands for scientific credibility 
which are made upon psychoanalysis from outside its field of practice, and 
18 The use of clinical vignettes as validation is one of the most strongly criticised aspects of 
psychoanalytic case presentations. See for example Spence (1994).     .   
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those which arise from within it.  ‘Outcome research’ is for the most part a 
response by the psychoanalytic profession to demonstrate that it can meet the 
requirements of ‘evidence-based medicine’ which are now being imposed on 
practitioners. (The redistribution of authority is from semi-autonomous 
professions to the regulatoary state.)  From this perspective the specific 
psychoanalytic processes through which outcomes are achieved are of little 
interest. In effect, the psychoanalytic interventions themselves are ‘black 
boxed’  as scientists put it. (Latour 1983). What is being measured are the 
effects of uniform and replicable treatments, while little significance is 
attached to the theories which may underpin them. Comparability (if not 
uniformity) of inputs is essential, and  it is this that treatment manuals aim to 
make possible.19 The requirement for rigorous methods in this form of 
research is principally to give credibility to the outcomes which can be claimed 
to have occurred.20   
 
The value of more rigorous qualitative research methods, such as the use of 
Grounded Theory, is of a different kind.  Here the purpose is to advance the 
production of ‘fundamental research’ in psychoanalysis, to make new 
discoveries which are primarily of interest to the scientific community of 
psychoanalysts and psychotherapists, and to other practitioners (such as 
social workers) who may share their understandings. The benefits to be 
derived from the improvement of qualitative research methodologies of this 
kind are largely endogenous to the field, contributing to its own development 
of theory and technique.    
 
19 A manual setting out guidelines for the Short Term Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy 
intervention developed in the IMPACT study is currently in preparation.  
20 However, the existence of data-sets reporting treatments of significant numbers of cases, 
where both the sample of cases and treatment methods have been standardised to provide a 
degree of uniformity and comparability, is a valuable resource for fundamental psychoanalytic 
research. It is noteworthy that the IMPACT study has already given rise to the adoption of its 
Short Term Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy model of treatment within child psychotherapy 
training, since it was found (even in advance of the outcome data from IMPACT being known) 
that this treatment protocol was especially appropriate for working with adolescent patients. 
Another researcher (Miriam Creaser)  using this data has been comparing audio transcripts of 
clinical sessions with the post-facto written notes made by the therapists, on which clinical 
researchers have hitherto mainly relied.   
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In the short term at least, it seems unlikely that such developments will have 
much direct bearing on the ‘external’ scientific reputation of psychoanalysis. 
The widespread intellectual and dispositional resistances to the recognition of 
unconscious mental phenomena seem unlikely to be dispelled merely by the 
use of rigorous qualitative methods (such as those of Grounded Theory) to 
analyse clinical records. The heuristic value of Grounded Theory (and of 
similar methodologies) to psychoanalysis is likely to be felt more within the 
field, than in its relations with those outside it. It can enhance the quality of 
fundamental psychoanalytic research and enlarge the community of 
psychoanalytic researchers.  
 
However one benefit that the use of such qualitative methods has conferred 
on the psychoanalytic field is the recognition of the legitimacy of 
psychoanalytic research, for example in making possible the undertaking and 
assessment of doctoral studies. The adoption of the standard protocols 
required for the validation of theses – systematic reviews of research 
literatures, the explicit formulation of research questions, and the adoption of 
recognised method of research – has made psychoanalytically-informed 
research methodologically comparable to research within different theoretical 
paradigms. This has been a significant advance for the field, and may in due 
course lead to a wider interest in its substantive findings and discoveries. 
 
The ‘theory neutrality’ of the Grounded Theory methodology has from this 
perspective been valuable.  Its founders (Glaser and Strauss 1967) 
prescribed that theory should emerge from data by a process of induction, 
contesting the doctrine that scientific research practice should consist of the 
empirical testing of theoretically-derived hypotheses.21 The inductive 
approach of Grounded Theory made less likely the disqualification of research 
for reasons of theoretical antipathy, since according to this model, theories 
are only useful in so far as they emerge from and give meaning to actual data.   
 
21 The Grounded Theorists in the 1960s were challenging the theoretical hegemony of 
structural functionalism in American sociology at the time, but also seeking to develop a 
method that was as empirically rigorous that of the influential quantitative methodologists of 
the time.   
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As the use of Grounded Theory has developed, especially in the social 
sciences, the anti-theoretical bias which might have imposed a constraint on 
psychoanalytically-oriented research has been modified by its leading 
practitioners.  Later advocates of the method, such as Charmaz  (2006) have 
acknowledged that in practice all researchers bring some theoretical 
preconceptions to their field. Psychoanalytic researchers thus need be no 
different from those working in other paradigms in the way in their relation to 
their object of study. It has thus proved feasible to explore questions (or ‘solve 
puzzles’) which can be characterised as the ‘normal science’ of the 
psychoanalytic paradigm (or that part of it occupied today by child 
psychotherapy), while at the same time making use of the primarily inductive, 
or more accurately abductive,22 research method of Grounded Theory. This is 
a rather unusual conjunction.    
 
The evidential problem which psychoanalytic researchers have had to 
confront arises from the central presupposition of their field, namely that 
unconscious mental states exist and exercise substantial causal powers over 
human thoughts, feeling and actions.  Since almost by definition, unconscious 
states of mind are not transparent to observers, or indeed to the self, and are 
known only by inferences from their effects, this has always constituted a 
methodological challenge for researchers.   
 
 A common starting-point for such investigations is where unexpected 
conjunctions of behaviour have occurred, but where explanations fail or are 
insufficient  unless they are able to take account of unconscious states of 
mind.  Some of the most significant discoveries of clinical research in child 
psychotherapy have been of this kind. Why, for example, do adoptive 
placements with apparently loving and well-balanced families sometimes 
encounter severe difficulties?  It has been found that explanations in terms of 
the ‘internalised beliefs’  of adopted children, regarding the expected 
behaviour of  parental figures, are the most adequate to this situation. This is 
especially the case where it is found that such beliefs can be modified through 
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being brought to conscious recognition in psychoanalytic therapy, and where 
as a result improvements in actual  relationships ensue. One way of putting 
this, adapting the sociological formulation of Max Weber (1978), is to say that 
investigation of the unconscious provides ‘explanation at the level of 
meaning’, adding to the ‘explanation at the level of cause’ which is achieved 
through the evidence of the constant conjunction of facts.  
 
It is usually a situation of ‘excess’  (Zizek 1990)  which creates the space in 
which psychoanalytic explanation is found necessary.  That is say, it is called 
for when what is happening seems to be beyond the limits of commonsense  
understandings.   After all, the main subject of psychoanalytic attention has 
from the start been states of mind and behaviour which  appear to lie beyond 
reason. It in this interesting space that  psychoanalysis makes its entry, 
whether in the case of individual subjects or social states of mind.  
 
It is because literature and the arts have been more willing to explore 
particularities and extremities of mind, feeling and personality, that they have 
an affinity with psychoanalysis which most of the sciences have lacked. The 
idea that the complexity of the mind is best traced through symbolic 
connections and equivalences has always been well understood by the 
writers of poetry, drama and fiction.  Imaginative literature and psychoanalysis 
both recognise that the understanding of minds depends on the interpretation 
of meanings, and not merely on the correlation of observed facts. Many of the 
connections explored in the ‘grounded theory’ analysis of clinical texts are  
those involving  symbolic and metaphoric meanings, with patients’ actions in 
the clinical setting understood in terms of what they signify and intend, often 
unconsciously.  The causal efficacy of a mental act (for example in making 
someone feel or behave in certain ways) can only be understood if attention is 
given to its ‘subjective meanings’ to those concerned.    
 
There is now a significant amount of completed psychoanalytical research 
which has made use of grounded theory methods (or of Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis). Some of this has taken place in the context of 
doctoral programmes in child psychotherapy (and other disciplines such as 
24 
 
  
social work) at the Tavistock and Portman NHS Trust.  The opportunity for 
clinicians to re-examine, as doctoral researchers, the records of their own 
sessional material (and other information surrounding a case) subsequent to 
the completion of their clinical work, has brought about new understandings 
and discoveries. The systematic ‘grounded theory’ analysis of clinical data    
has made visible latent patterns and meanings which had often not been 
recognised while the clinical work was proceeding. In supervision the priority 
will often have been to understand the immediate interactions and needs of a 
patient and the therapist - with difficult patients these can be intense - and not 
with wider questions of theory or technique.   
 
 
The line-by-line supervision of a clinical case usually involves the detailed 
consideration of particulars – for example specific patient-therapist 
interactions. It slows down the action, so to speak, so that it can be examined 
more closely. Subsequent grounded theory analysis of the material creates an 
additional space for reflection. It allows - indeed requires – the systematic 
study of an entire clinical record, session by session. Its ‘constant 
comparative method’ prescribes the generation of codes, categories and 
ultimately concepts and theories (in ascending order of generality and 
transferability) from the clinical material itself. The requirement that there 
should be explicit criteria for the selection of  clinical episodes  for detailed 
study makes the research process accountable and transparent, lessening 
the risk that findings may merely reflect a clinician’s desires or prejudices.23 
The starting-point for such a selection may be a therapist’s memory of 
particularly intense, painful, or even epiphanic  episodes, or of the impact on 
her of a particular case. However the requirement to describe and locate 
these in a specified conceptual field adds to them a dimension of objectivity, 
and enhances their value as evidence.    
 
The tabular notation often sometimes favoured in Grounded Theory analysis, 
is often an aid to inference, connection, and discovery. Usually, the first 
23  Britton (1998) describes this risk as it arises in analytic work itself.  
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column is the transcribed or literally-recorded clinical material itself, its 
segments following downwards in temporal sequence. Subsequent columns, 
which may be labelled codes, categories and finally concepts, are set out in 
rows from left to right. This tabular format enables  concepts to be related to 
the material from which they emerge, and sequences of clinical descriptions 
to be interrogated for previously unrecognised meanings. It may be 
illuminating to use separate columns for the description and words of patients 
and therapists,  to map their interactions. Patterns, for example of regression, 
repetition or therapeutic progress, can be identified, and the heuristic value or 
‘groundedness’ of theoretical conjectures tested against the evidence for 
them, there on the page.  Of course, distinctions of these kinds are commonly 
made in the narrative analysis of clinical sessions, with segments of clinical 
material followed by analytic commentary on their meaning.  However, some 
have found that tabular representations of the analytic process can aid 
understanding,  just as Bion’s ‘grid’ was found useful by him and others in 
defining different levels of reflective capacity in the mind. It may happen that 
in setting out a notation to represent a clinical process, a researcher may lose 
contact with its inner ‘music’, as perhaps can be the case in the study of a 
musical score. Grounded theory analysis at its best is not a mechanistic 
procedure, but enables its practitioners to recover and re-imagine their 
original clinical experience. 
 
Research using grounded theory: some examples  
 
There are a number of examples in the published child psychotherapy 
literature of clinical studies which have advanced knowledge with the aid of 
the practice of grounded theory analysis.  Nearly all of these had their origin in 
doctoral research, subsequently written up for publication. There are now also 
many completed doctoral theses, accessible through libraries, which one 
hopes will soon become available for wider readerships.. 
 
I will briefly summarise a few of these examples.  Marguerite Reid (2003) 
analysed the clinical record of her work with vulnerable mothers who had 
earlier lost a baby, and whose states of mind during a new pregnancy were a 
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source of concern.  Her grounded theory analysis of her clinical record 
revealed that the unconscious configuration which was giving rise to anxiety 
was connected to unresolved mourning for a lost infant.  The therapeutic 
intervention which enabled this to be worked through made it possible to 
accept the potentiality of a new alive baby, taking the place of the dead baby 
of phantasy. It was notable that the researcher found herself drawing on the 
core ideas of Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia as she sought to give 
theoretical meaning to her clinical material. Subsequently Reid has found that 
the ideas evolved in her clinical study have had a fruitful application in 
reflections on certain works of literature, where the consequences for 
individuals of early exposure to the states of mind of mothers who had been 
bereaved through loss of an earlier child, have been explored.  Reid also 
found that her research had a significant clinical impact, enabling her to gain 
support for the establishing of a perinatal psychotherapy service for mothers 
found to be at risk for this reason. 
 
Janet Anderson’s (2003) study of children who engage in extreme risk-taking 
behaviour, was also based on a Grounded Theory analysis of her clinical case 
records, as she herself has described.  This was an instance where the 
emergence of the ideas which gave meaning to cases which had at first sight 
seemed more different than similar came from intensive analysis of the 
material.  More mechanistic  kinds of factorial analysis had failed to establish 
a coherent explanation,  when she recalled the more holistic pattern which 
Freud had recognised in Sophocles tragedy of King Oedipus, and perceived, 
in a remarkable serendipitous intuition, its relevance to her sequence of 
clinical cases. The central issue was the troubled relationship of a child to a 
parental couple, and the several different unconscious constellations of mind 
which could influence this.  Oedipus has been put out to die, as a baby, 
because of a prophecy (unconscious phantasy) that he would grow up to kill 
his father. Anderson’s creative conjecture was that a child engaged in risk-
taking behaviour might feel himself to have been denied his parents’ love, and 
metaphorically left out to die, the terror of which was being perhaps enacted in 
quasi-suicidal risk-taking.  Anderson developed a concept of ‘havens’ to 
characterise these relationships, One of these was the phantasy of  expulsion 
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and exposure, which she termed  ‘no haven’.   Another configuration was 
where anxiety concerning unconscious feelings of hatred led to a mother’s 
total possessiveness and reluctance to separate from a son (all of these risk-
taking patients were male, in this particular sequence of work.) This led 
certain boys to be possessed by an illusion of invulnerability, leading them to 
take risks while in a state of denial, but at the same time enacting the 
disavowed destructive anxiety of the parents (mother in particular) which had 
been projected into them. (Anderson termed this state of mind, ‘illusory 
haven’.)  It is striking that,  as in Reid’s work, illumination came, in this case in 
an unforeseen way, from Anderson’s recalling the theory of Oedipal desires 
and anxieties which has always been fundamental to the psychoanalytic 
paradigm. Anderson’s work has a significant implication for clinical 
assessment and practice, in that it proposes that attention be given to the 
unconscious phantasies active within those families where children are found 
to be enacting behaviours dangerous to themselves. 
 
A third example is Jenifer Wakelyn’s study of the experiences of an infant who 
was placed in foster-care from birth, with a view to an eventual adoption which 
did indeed take place at the end of a year.  Her role was as a ‘therapeutic 
observer’, that is to say as an observer who both made use of the methods of 
psychoanalytic infant observation long established at the Tavistock, and now 
widely followed elsewhere, and who  took a more active role in facilitating the 
family’s experience of fostering this baby.  Wakelyn became particularly 
interested in the relationship between the baby, the family and the system of 
local authority care which held the formal responsibility for the baby’s well-
being.  From her grounded theory analysis of the data, concepts emerged 
which gave meaning to the emotional experiences of all those involved in the 
situation.  Her  key concepts – they are metaphors – were Tornado, Machine, 
and Limbo, to characterise states of disorganisation and confusion 
surrounding surrounding the infant, and Matrix to describe a state of  
containment and connectedness.  These ideas convey the intensity of the 
emotional force-field to which the infant and his temporary family were 
exposed. This is highly relevant to the understanding of the situation of 
looked-after children, but is often overlooked as individuals and social 
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systems defend themselves against the anxieties, conscious and 
unconscious, which might otherwise be aroused by emotional contact with the 
traumatic situation of such children and their families. The value of this work is 
on the one hand to show how insensitive professional/ bureaucratic networks 
can be in the performance of their tasks. The  proposed hand-over of the baby 
to its prospective adoptive parents, hundreds of miles away, was for all the 
world as if it was merely a parcel, until an intervention was made to conduct  
this in a more sensitive way.  On the other hand, its value is to show that the 
reliable  presence of a psychoanalytic informed observer can itself provide 
emotional containment to protect a family from the turbulence around it, even 
more where an  observer role  has been extended in a therapeutic direction. 
 
A fourth example is of the use of the grounded theory method to reflect on a 
psychoanalytic infant observation. Wendy Shallcross’s doctoral thesis was 
about the first year of life of a child whom she originally observed as a student 
many years before she decided to make this the subject of her research. The 
observation had several distinctive features, including a serious accident 
befalling the infant’s mother, her consequent separation from her baby for a 
period,  until she returned home from hospital, while the observation 
continued on its weekly basis.   Among the issues to which Shallcross (2012) 
chose to give  attention was the development of the infant in its first four 
weeks of life.  She formulated the view,  through close attention to the detail of 
what she had seen, and had described each week in her exceptionally fine-
grained notes,  that the infant  had developed a far more active and curious 
relationship with his environment than conventional accounts of infant 
development specify. She also came to believe that a disposition of the infant 
to defend himself against the overwhelming intensity of feelings aroused in 
him by his experience of mother and her breast, visible in the earliest 
movements of his hands, could be seen to be a precursor to the later 
defences he adopted when exposed to the trauma of his mother’s absence, 
and of her subsequent return in what seemed to him (at first) to be a quite 
damaged condition. She saw this response as an instance of the ‘aesthetic 
conflict’ which Donald Meltzer (1988) has argued is a recurring aspect of an 
infant’s relationship to mother’s breast.  One pleasing aspect of this study is 
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that although it describes a nearly-catastrophic event in the life of the family, 
whose  distressing circumstances are described by the researcher, the family 
was able to resume a benign course of development, which the observer was 
able to record during the later part of her two year  observation.  
 
The final example of research I will give is so far available only in its doctoral 
thesis form. Marie Bradley undertook an intervention in the child care system, 
whose purpose was to explore whether a child psychotherapy procedure of 
assessment, undertaken over just four sessions, could provide an 
understanding of the state of mind of children awaiting placement which would 
be deeper and more informative than that usually available to the professional 
networks charged with making such decisions.  This was in response to 
recognition of the fact that decisions about the placement of children were 
often being made with insufficient knowledge of their  states of mind, or even 
history, and that in general children themselves seem to have little presence 
or voice in decisions which are fundamental to their well-being.  
 
Bradley discovered that a great deal could be learned from these four-session 
assessments, whose essential procedure was to allow each child a space to 
express his thoughts and feelings not through being interviewed or asked 
questions, but through being given the kinds of simple materials for play and 
drawing of which child psychotherapists make use in the clinical setting. The 
hope was that in this setting the children might able to communicate their 
states of mind, hopes and expectations, in their own way. Bradley found that 
this was indeed what took place, and that she learned a great deal about the 
children she assessed, including aspects of them which were unexpected.  
Children who had appeared quite defended and resistant to human contact, in 
a more formal situation, were able to express themselves in this context, and 
to intuitively recognise that the therapist they were meeting was interested in 
and capable of understanding them.  She also found that the network 
responsible for decision-making were responsive to the assessments she 
provided, in particular because of the detailed descriptions she could  give of 
what the children had actually said and done in their four meetings with her. 
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Specifically relevant from the research being considered in this article was 
Bradley’s experience that it was the analysis of her own assessment record 
using a Grounded Theory method which enhanced her understandings of the 
children.  She had written a record of each assessment session in as much 
detail as she could remember, immediately after it had taken place. Child 
psychotherapists are trained over many years to write such reports from 
memory.  It was the line-by-line analysis of the material which had revealed  
the depth of meaning it contained. For example, it was the appearance, in an 
apparently tough and defended boy, of quite tender feelings and 
identifications, in his play with the toy animals and people she had provided, 
which made her recognise this child’s capacity and need for affection.  This 
made it possible to consider different placement and  therapeutic options for 
this child  than might have been found  appropriate if  more superficial reports 
and assessment procedures had provided the grounds for decisions.   
 
The practical value of this work has been to demonstrate the contribution that 
a psychoanalytically informed assessment method can make to the sensitivity 
of decision-making in child care, and thus to the broader therapeutic and 
consultative roles which child psychotherapists can usefully take. Bradley’s 
work is a model demonstration of how Grounded Theory methods can be 
used not merely to undertake research analysis on previously completed 
clinical work, but also as an in vivo component of  practical interventions. 
 
I hope that the five examples summarised above have demonstrated the 
value of grounded theory methods in  research in child psychotherapy which 
advances its knowledge, not merely of the outcomes of treatment, but also of 
its  theories and techniques.  One notable feature is that in three out of five of 
these (those of Anderson, Reid and Bradley)  the research was with samples 
of cases, not on a single case alone, though numbers were unavoidably 
limited by the fact that these were all single-handed researchers.  Where 
larger numbers of comparable cases can be gathered together (for example 
as a by-product of a randomised controlled trial outcome study like IMPACT) 
there is  potential for deploying the Grounded Theory method of research with 
broader comparative aims.   
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The broader social science literature on Grounded Theory methods is at 
present notable for the absence of reference to  unconscious mental 
phenomena.  The Handbook of Grounded Theory published by Sage, one of 
many such texts on research methods, makes scarcely any reference to 
psychoanalytic ideas. A systematic demonstration of the uses of grounded 
theory in different contexts of psychoanalytic research  -  for example  in 
settings of infant observation, young child observation, ‘work discussion’,  
clinical work with individuals and groups, and in consultancy to organisations -  
is much needed and  long overdue.   
 
 
References 
 
 
Anderson, J. (2003) ‘The mythic significance of risk-taking, dangerous, behaviour,’ 
Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 29 (1) 75-91  
Anderson, J. (2006) ‘Well-suited partners: psychoanalytic research and grounded 
theory’, Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 32, (3,) 329-348 
Ball, S.J.  (2013)The Education Debate (2nd ed) Bristol: Policy Press.   
Black, M. (1962).  Models and Metaphors. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Boston, M. and Szur, R. (1983)   Psychotherapy with Severely Deprived Children. 
London: Routledge 
Briggs, A. (ed) (2012) Waiting to be Found: Papers on Children in Care.  London: 
Karnac.  
Britton, R. (1998) ‘The analyst’s intuition:  selected fact or overvalued idea?’ in Belief 
and Imagination, London: Routledge. Pp 97-198.   
Britton, R.  (2015)  Between Mind and Brain: Models of the Mind: Models in the Mind. 
London: Karnac. Pp 45-54    
Charmaz, K. (2006) Constructing Grounded Theory.   London: Sage.   
Clarke, J. and Newman, J. (1997). The Managerial State. London: Sage.  
Clarke, J.H., Gewirtz, S, McLaughlin, E. (eds) (2000)  New Managerialism, New 
Welfare. London: Sage.  
Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003) Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from 
Developmental Psychology.  
32 
 
  
Fonagy, P. (200)  ‘Research in child psychotherapy: Programmes, problems and 
possibilities’, in N. Midgley, J. Anderson, E. Grainger, T. Nesic-Vuckovic, C. Urwin 
(eds.)  Child Psychotherapy and Research. London: Routledge.  
Galison, P. & Stump,  D.J. (eds) (1996) The Disunity of Science. Stanford, Ca: 
Stanford University Press 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books   
Glaser, B. and Strauss, A.  (1967)  The Discovery of Grounded Theory.   
Grünbaum, A. (1974) The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: a Philosophical Critique.  
Berkeley, Ca:   University of California Press.  
Heimann, P.  (1950) 'On counter-transference,' International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 31 (1/2) 81-84   
Henry, G. (1974). ‘Doubly Deprived’.  Journal of Child Psychotherapy,3 (4)  29-43.  
Hinshelwood, R.D. (2013)    Research on the Couch: single case-studies, subjectivity 
and scientific knowledge.  London: Routledge.   
Hoggart, R.  (1967) The Uses of Literacy. London: Chatto and Windus. Pp 291-317.  
Keegan, J. (1976) The Face of Battle: Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme.  London: 
Jonathan Cape.  
Kennedy, E.  (2004) Child and Adolescent Psychotherapy: A Systemic Review of 
Psychoanalytic Approaches. North Central London Strategic Health Authority. 
Kennedy, E., and Midgley, N. (2007)   Process and Outcome Research in Child, 
Adolescent, and Parent-Infant Psychotherapy: a Thematic Review. North Central 
London Strategic Health Authority.  
Klein, M.  (1926)    ‘The Psychological Principles of Infant Analysis’, reprinted in Love 
Guilt and Reparation and other works 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press (1975) pp 
128 – 138. 
Kuhn, T.S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, Ill. Chicago 
University Press. 
Kuhn, T.S.  (2000)The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays 1970-1993.  
Chicago:  Chicago University Press. 
Latour, B. (1983) Science in Action. Cambridge, Ma:  Harvard University Press.  
Layard, R. and Clarke, D. (2015) Thrive: The Power of Psychological Therapy. 
London: Penguin.  
Le Grand, J. (2006) Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, 
Pawns and Queens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Meltzer, D. (1988)   ‘Aesthetic Conflict and its place in Development’,  in D. Meltzer 
and M.Harris Williams, The Apprehension of Beauty. Perthshire:  Clunie Press,  pp 7-
34.    
33 
 
  
Midgley, N. (2004) 'Sailing between Scylla and Charybdis; incorporating qualitative 
approaches into child psychotherapy research.' Journal of Child Psychotherapy   30 
(1)   89-111. 
Midgley, N.  (2006)'The inseparable bond between cure and research': clinical case 
study as a method of psychoanalytic inquiry.'  Journal of Child Psychotherapy 32 (2) 
122-147.      
Midgley, N. and Kennedy, E., (2011) ‘Psychodynamic psychotherapy for children and 
adolescents: a critical review of the evidence base.’   Journal of Child Psychotherapy  
37, (3)  232-260.  
Money-Kyrle, R.  (1968).’Cognitive Development’. International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis 49, 691-698.  
Money, Kyrle, R. (1971) ‘The Aim of Psychoanalysis’. International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 52, 103-106.  
Popper, K.R. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations.  London: Routledge and Kegan pp 
35-65. 
Puttnam, H.  (1975) ‘The Corroboration of Theories’, in Mathematics, Matter and 
Method: Philosophical Papers Vol.1 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  Pp 
250-269.    
Reid, M. (2003) ‘Clinical Research: the inner world of the mother and her new baby: 
born in the shadow of death.’  Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 29 (2) 207-226 
Ricoeur, P. (1970).  Freud and Philosophy. New Haven, Conn:  Yale University 
Press. Pp 345-375.  
Rosenfeld, H. (1971) 'A clinical approach to the psychoanalytic theory of the life and 
death instincts: an investigation into the aggressive aspects of narcissism', 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 52: 169-178. 
Rustin, M. J. (2014) Review of R.D. Hinshelwood, Research on the Couch (2013) 
Journal of Child Psychotherapy, Vol 40, (1)  118-126     
Shallcross, W. (2012) ‘What can be learned from a single case of infant observation.  
In C. Urwin and J. Sternberg, Infant Observation and Research:  Emotional 
Processes in Everyday Lives. London: Routledge. Pp 69-80.  
Spence, D.P. (1994) 'The special nature of psychoanalytic facts.' International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis. 75, (5/6), 915-927. 
Stove, D. (1982)  Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists. Oxford:     
Pergamon Press.      
Strachey, J. (l934) 'The nature of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis,' 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 15 pp 127 - 159. 
34 
 
  
Kuhn, T.S.  (2000) ‘The Road Since Structure:  Philosophical Essays 1970-1993.  
Chicago: Chicago University Press. Pp 90-104.   
Tuckett, D. (1994) ‘Developing a Grounded Hypothesis to Understand a Clinical 
Process: The Role of Conceptualisation in Validation’ International Journal of 
Psycho-Analysis, 1994; v. 75, p1159, 22p 
Tuckett, D. (2000) ‘Theoretical Pluralism and the Construction of Psychoanalytic 
Knowledge,’ in P. Fonagy, R. Michels, J. Sandler (ed) Changing Ideas In A Changing 
World: The Revolution in Psychoanalysis. Essays in Honour of Arnold Cooper. 
London: Karnac.  
Tuckett, D.  (2005) ‘Some Developments in Psychoanalytic Thinking in Great Britain 
and Continental Europe’ in M. Cooper, G. Gabbard, E. Person (eds)  American 
Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Psychoanalysis. Washington DC and London: 
American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Wakelyn, J. (2011) ‘Therapeutic observation of an infant in foster care. ‘ Journal of 
Child Psychotherapy 37 (3) 280 – 310). 
Wallerstein, R. (2005)  ‘Will psychoanalytic pluralism be the enduring state of our 
discipline?’ International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 86, (3)   623-6.  
Weber, Max.  (1978)  Economy and Society, Vol 1.  Berkeley Ca: University of 
California Press.  
Zizek, S.  (1990)  ‘Eastern European Republics of Gilead.’ New Left Review 183. 
Oct-Nov., pp 50-62.  
 
 
35 
 
